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1. Introduction 
Increasing human populations result in a growing demand for urban space and land for 
agricultural production. Over the last few centuries there has been an increasing conversion of 
many natural habitats for rare and endangered species to serve human needs. Costello and 
Polasky (2004) highlight these changes as “Only about fifty percent of the forest area that existed 
at the time of the rise of agriculture remains, of which less than half remains in large tracts 
capable of sustaining a full range of biological diversity.” Balmford et al. (2002) find that 
globally intact ecosystems are being converted to other uses at a rate of one percent per year. 
Closer to home, according to the Illinois Wildlife Action Plan (IDNR, 2005) Illinois has lost over 
90 percent of its original wetlands, 99.9 percent of its original prairie, and over the past 30 years, 
populations of many wildlife species have fallen dramatically. The importance of preserving 
natural habitat is increasing daily as more and more species become extinct or endangered.  
 
The importance of preserving natural habitats extends beyond conservation. Many natural 
habitats throughout the world provide a vast array of ecosystem services and also enable carbon 
sequestration. A study for the South African National Biodiversity Institute conservatively 
estimated the flow of ecosystem services in grasslands in South Africa to be in the order of 9.7 
billion rand per year or 29,000 rand per square kilometer (De Wit and Blignaut 2006). Further, 
the carbon storage value for British Columbia’s grasslands is estimated at $21 million per year 
(Wilson 2009). Therefore, preserved natural habitat has the ability to mitigate the extent of 
climate change. 
 
As the demand for land increases with increased demand for food and living space the task of 
preserving natural habitat becomes difficult. At the same time a growing literature on nonmarket 
valuations indicates that people have a significant willingness to pay for preserving natural 
habitat and consuming the environmental amenities. Loomis et al. (2000) conduct a contingent 
valuation survey on restoring the ecosystem in a river basin and find that households would pay 
an average of $21 per month or $252 annually for the additional ecosystem services, a total 
between $19 million to $70 million
1. An Economic Research Service report by Sullivan et. al. 
(2004) finds a $300 million dollars per year increase in outdoor recreational expenditures due to 
                                                 
1 The large spread due to whether those refusing to be interviewed have a zero value or not.   3
land enrolled in the Conservation Reserve Program. These studies are an example of many that 
highlight the direct recreation use value and existence value of the natural environment.  
 
In this paper we ask the question “what is the optimal allocation of land for conservation?” and 
“what tax instruments can be used to achieve this optimal allocation?” We use a general 
equilibrium framework to study the use of tax instruments to achieve the first best allocation of 
land for conservation. The optimal allocation of land to be preserved as natural habitat should 
consider the consumers’ use values and nonuse values for preserved natural habitat. Therefore, 
following Anas (1988), we construct a model in which the households obtain utility from direct 
use of the environment and indirectly from the existence and option value of the environment 
where the direct use results in congestion. We then analyze various tax instruments under public 
and private provision of the environmental good. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review of the general 
equilibrium land allocation models and the environmental tax literature. Section 3 introduces the 
general model based on Anas (1988). In section 4 we present the scenario where the public good, 
the environment, is provided by a government or a conservation agency. Section 4.1 presents the 
socials planner’s first best outcome. Section 4.2 analyzes the private markets under various tax 
instruments. In section 4.2.1 we show that a per unit lump sum tax on the environment, similar to 
Anas (1988), along with a tax on recreation can achieve the first best outcome. A tax on the 
environment requires measuring the total value of the environment and we avoid this in section 
4.2.2 and 4.2.3 by considering a utility maximizing government that provides the public good E. 
We show that the utility maximizing government combined with a tax on recreation or a tax on 
wages can internalize the externality caused by congestion leading to the first best outcome. In 
section 5, we present the scenario where the public good, the environment, is privately provided 
by households that purchase land to be set aside as environmental land. Section 5.1 presents the 
socials planner’s first best outcome. In section5.2 we show that a subsidy on land set aside for 
the environment combined with a recreation or wage tax can achieve the first best outcome. 
 
 
   4
2. Literature Review (Still Incomplete) 
 
Anas (1988) presented the first example of using a GE analysis to understand the optimal 
allocation of land for conservation. The author uses a static long-run land equilibrium model and 
specifies the natural environment as both a congestible public good due to recreation and pure 
public good due to existence and option value. He shows that a tax on recreation and a tax on the 
quality of the natural environment can achieve a first best allocation. Anas (1988) also presents a 
second best analysis and shows that in a Cobb-Douglas world visitation fees and visitation 
quotas are the only second-best instruments.  
 
Giménez and González-Gómez (2003) present a static analysis similar to Anas (1988) where 
they extend the model to include heterogeneous agents and therefore use a rational general 
equilibrium model based on the microeconomic land use model by López, Shah, and Altobello 
(1994). Further they include an explicit time constraint (Anas (1988) does not specify a 
constraint on time). However, they ignore the impact of congestion, a fundamental reality of 
using the environment.  
 
We extend Anas’s model by explicitly including a time constraint. Further given that it is 
difficult to tax the environmental we present an alternative method to achieve the first best 
optimal. Our model differs from Giménez and González-Gómez (2003) since we include 
congestion and we present a general equilibrium analysis similar to Anas (1998). Further, in our 
last section we analyze the private provision of the public good where the households can sell 
their land to be used as environmental land. This differs from Giménez and González-Gómez 
(2003) where the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism assumes that the households voluntarily 
provide the land for the environment.  
 
Perhaps the biggest contribution in our analysis is that we use the tools from the environmental 
tax literature (Fullerton and Kinnaman 1995, Fullerton 1997, Fullerton and Wonverton 1999; 
2000) to understand how a multiple taxes can be used to achieve the optimum allocation of land 
for conservation. Our analysis, though based on the work by Fullerton and colleagues, differs 
from their work because we apply their insights to a public good as opposed to a public bad and   5
we analyze a specific problem where the value of the public good depends on congestion caused 
by the use of the public good and the amount of land used for the public good. Therefore our 
results extend the environmental tax literature by highlighting the optimal taxation given a public 




We consider a competitive three-sector economy with a representative household that produce a 
composite good C, housing H, and environmental amenity E, using two factors of production, 
land L and labor (time) M. Labor is fully mobile and can be used by any sector. The composite 
good C, and housing H, is produced by a competitive firm. The environmental amenity E is 




We consider a competitive three-sector economy with a 
representative household defined using the following notation.  
 
Two factors of production 
L Land 
M Labor,  fully  mobile 
 
Three goods 
C Composite  good  ( , )  cc CC L M 
H Housing      h HL   
E Environment    ( , )  ee EE N L N M 
 













Lower case subscripts denote a factor of production being used in 
the production of a good, i.e.  c L  is the land used in the   6
production of good C.  
The constant returns to scale production functions for the composite good and housing are: 
(, )  cc CC L M         ( 1 )  
()  hh HH L L           ( 2 )  
where  c L is the land devoted to the production of good C and  c M  is the amount of time used as 
labor in the production of good C, and  h L  is the amount land devoted to housing. 
 
The production function for the environmental amenity is: 
 (, )  ee EE L M         ( 3 )  
where  e L is the amount of land devoted to natural habitat,  e M is the total amount time spent in 
the environment (i.e. on hiking, fishing, hunting, and other forms of recreation). The production 
of the environmental good is increasing in the amount of land devoted to the environment and 
decreasing in the time spent in the environment due to congestion, i.e.  0
ee M L E E  .  
 
The resource constraint for time,  
  ce M MM             ( 5 )    
where  c M  is the amount of time spent working in the firm, and  e M  is the amount of time spent 
on recreation.  
 
The resource constraints for land is given by 
  che L LLL            ( 6 )  
where  c L  is the amount of land devoted to the production of C,  h L  is the amount of land 
devoted for housing and  e L  is the amount of land set aside as environmental land. 
 
4. Public Provision of the Environmental Good 
The utility of the representative household depends on the consumption of the composite good 
C, and housing H , and the natural habitat E . The natural habitat E  enters the utility function   7
in two forms, the direct use values are represented as  e M E where  e M  is the time spent in the 
environment, and the non-use option and existence values are represented by E. 
(,, ;) e UXHMEE          ( 4 )  
The representative household is endowed with M  units of time and L  units of land.  
 
4.1 Social Planners’ Problem  
Given the above model the social planner’s maximization problem can be solved to obtain the 
first best allocations. The social planner maximizes the aggregate utility given the resource 
constraints,  
 
,, , , (, , ;) (( , ) , , ( , ) ;( , ) )  
ce h c e
ec c h e e e e e MMLLL
M a x UCHMEE UCL M L MEN L N M EN L N M    (7) 
such that
2,  
(i)  che L LLL            ( 8 )  
(ii)  ce M MM            ( 9 )  
 
The first order necessary conditions necessary for a maximum,  
 
with respect to the decision variables 
0   
c cC M MU C           ( 1 0 )  
0   
c cC L LU C           ( 1 1 )  
 
0     hH LU           ( 1 2 )  
 
() () 0
ee e e eM E M E N M eE N M MUE N UE M N U E           (13) 
() 0
ee e eM E N L e E N L LN UE M N U E           ( 1 4 )  
 
with respect to the LaGrange multipliers 
                                                 
2 The resource constraints can be substituted into the utility function to directly analyze the social planner’s first 
best. We consider the resource constraints separately to be able to analyze the Lagrange multipliers.    8
che LLLL             ( 1 5 )  
ce M MM             ( 1 6 )  
 
Equations (10) and (11) indicate that the Lagrange multipliers   and   are the marginal 
benefits of using land and labor in the production of the composite commodity. Equation (12) 
indicates that   is the marginal utility of using land for housing.  
 
Equation (13) indicates that   is the marginal utility gained by spending an additional unit of 
time on recreation (using the environment good E).
3 The first term is the marginally utility 
gained by the direct use which depends on the existing value of E and is positive. The second 
term is the marginal disutility from the marginal decrease in E due to the congestion created by 
the direct use and is negative. The third term is the marginal disutility from the marginal 
decrease in option and existence values due to congestion. Let  () ee e M EN M e E N M NU E M NU E   . 
Comparing (10) and (13) highlight that at the optimum, the marginal utility from using time 
(labor) for recreation or for the production of good C are equal. The marginal utility of spending 
an additional unit of time for production is equal to the total marginal utility obtained from 
spending an additional unit of time on recreation given the existing value of E.  
 
Equation (14) indicates that   is the marginal utility gained by setting aside an additional unit of 
land as environmental land. The first term is the marginal utility from the direct use due to the 
increase in E and the second term is the marginal utility from the existence and option value due 
to the increase in E. Let  () ee e M EN L e E N L NU E M NU E   . 
Comparing (11), (12) and (13) highlight that at the optimum, using land for either housing, or the 
production of good C or setting land aside for the environment has the same marginal utility.  
 
 
The social planner’s first best outcome can be obtained by substituting (15) and (16) in (12), 
(13), and (14):  
                                                 
3 Since  0   , at the optimum, the utility gained from directly using E has to be greater than the decrease in the 
utility caused by the decrease in E as a result of the direct use of E (i.e. congestion).   9
 
0  
c HC L UU C           (12*) 
() 0
ec ME C M UE U C            (13*) 
0
c CL UC            (14*) 
 
4.2 Private Markets  
Next we consider a general equilibrium set up with a representative household, producers for the 
composite commodity and housing and a government/environmental sector and analyze the tax 
instruments to achieve a first best outcome. We assume the price of the composite commodity 
c p  = 1 and the price of housing is  h p . The price of land input is  l p , and the price of time is w, 
i.e. wage. 
 
The producers of the composite commodity C solve  
Maximize = ( , )   ccc cl c c p CL M pL w M       ( 1 7 )  
 
The resulting FOCs give 

cc cL l l L pC p p C         ( 1 8 )  

cc cM M pC w w C         ( 1 9 )  
 
The producers of housing, H, solve,  
Maximize ( )      hhh l hh h l h p HL p L p L p L      ( 2 0 )  
 






            ( 2 1 )    






            ( 2 2 )    
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We model the government/environment sector and the representative household using two 
alternate methods. In the first method, following Anas (1988), we assume that the government is 
able to charge a per unit tax on E and that E is provided by a profit maximizing conservation 
agency. This assumes that E is measurable and quantifiable. The second method relaxes the need 
for measuring the total value of the environment. In the second methods we assume that the 
government provides the environmental good and maximizes the net utility given the 
household’s decision. In addition, we consider a tax on wage or a tax on time spent on recreation. 
 
4.2.1 A Tax on the Existence Value of the Environment and a Tax on Recreation 
 
Following Anas (1988) we assume the government collects a per unit tax   for each unit of the 
environment good. In addition we introduce a per unit tax m for each unit of time used for 
recreation
4. The per unit tax on the environment,   is implicitly a lump sum tax. Collecting a per 
unit tax on the total value of the environment is not unreasonable as might first appear. There is a 
growing literature aimed at valuing the ecosystem services and to create indices that value 
ecosystems. Costanza et al. (1997) estimated the total value of the biosphere to be in the range of 
US$16–54 trillion per year, with an average of US$33 trillion per year. The tax revenue is given 
to a conservation agency that maximizes the amount of the environment (or the government acts 
to maximize the quality of the environment) that provides the environmental amenity. At the 
optimum the conservation agency will have zero profit. 
 
The providers of the environment good (either the government or an agency) purchase land for 
the environment.  
Maximize =  ( , )   
e
ee l e L




e lN L pN E             ( 2 4 )  
 
                                                 
4 Similar to the previous analysis, 4.2.1, a wage tax (subsidy) can be considered instead of the recreation tax m .   11
Now the representative household pays a per unit tax or visitation fee, m, for the time spend on 
recreation and a per unit tax   for each unit of the environment. The household’s maximization 






Max U C H M E E   
s.t.  
() le x h m e p Lw MM p Cp H M E             ( 2 5 )  
 
The corresponding Lagrangian is,  
,, (, , ;) [ ( ) ]
e
el e x h m e CHM Max U C H M E E p L w M M p C p H M E              (26) 
 
The consumers FOCs, with prices substituted with marginal products as in Fullerton and 
Kinnaman (1995), give, 
0    C CU           ( 2 7 )  
(/ ) 0    
c HL HU C          ( 2 8 )  
0     
ec eM E M m MU E C         ( 2 9 )  
 
Substituting the value of   from (27) into (28) gives, 
 
c H CL UU C            (30*) 
 
Substituting the price of land (18) into (24) gives,  
0
ce LN L CN E             ( 3 1 )  
Let




 .            ( 3 2 )  
 











, the first term represents the change is utility due to the   12
direct use, and the second term represents the change in utility due to the option and existence 
value. The denominator converts the change in utility to dollars. 
 
Substituting  from (32) into (31) gives,    
() ce e e CL M E N L e EN L U C NU E M NU E          (33*) 
Let  
  m 


              ( 3 4 )  
 
The numerator is the change in marginal social utility due to the marginal change in E from an 
increase in the time spent consuming the environment,  e M ,  () 
ee M Ee E M NU M NU E , the first 
term represents the change in utility due to the direct use, and the second term represents the 
change in utility due to the option and existence value. The denominator converts the change in 
utility to dollars. 
 
Substituting mfrom (34) into (29) gives, 
  ce CM M E UC U E            (35*)   
 
The private market’s FOCs represented by equation (30*) (33*) and (35*) are identical to the 
social planners optimal FOCs (12*), (13*) and (14*). Therefore the recreation tax, m and the 
“lump sum” environmental tax   achieve the first best optimum. 
 
 
4.2.2 Government Provides E and Maximizes Net Utility with a Tax on Wage 
 
The above formulation requires a tax on the quantity/value of the environment presented by E. 
We next present an alternative formulation that does not require a direct tax on the environment. 
The government maximizes the net benefit from committing land for the environment given the 
household’s decisions. The marginal utility of income is given by  . 
   13
 
( , ,( ,) ; ( ,) )  
E
ee e e e L E L
Max U C H M E NL NM E NL NM p L      (36) 
 
The resulting FOC gives 




              ( 3 7 )  
 
The representative household sells the endowment of land, L, and part of the labor endowment, 
c M  in the market, and uses the remaining labor endowment for recreation,  e M . The wage earned 
is taxed with a tax,  w. The household purchases the consumption good, C, and housing, H. 
Then the household’s maximization problem is given by,  
 
,, (, , ;)
e
e CHM
Max U C H M E E   
s.t.  
() ( 1 ) lw e x h p Lw M p Cp H              ( 3 8 )  
 
The corresponding Lagrangian is,  
 
,, (, , ;) [ ( ) ( ) ]
e
el w e c h CHM Max U C H M E E p L w M M p C p H          (39)   
The household’s FOCs give,  
0    C CU           ( 4 0 )  
0    HH HU p           ( 4 1 )  
() 0     
e eM E w MU Ew          ( 4 2 )  
 
Equation (40) indicates that  is the marginal utility of C, since C is the numeraire good, this 
implies that  is the marginal utility of income.  
 
Following Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995), replacing the prices with the marginal products give: 







            ( 4 3 )  
Substituting w from (19) into (42) 
0
ec ME M w UEC              ( 4 4 )  




            ( 4 5 )  
 
We can solve the FOCs for the Pigouvian taxes that will lead to the perfectly competitive private 
markets to match the socially optimal solution as follows. Substituting the value of   from (40) 
into (43): 
 
c H CL UU C            (46*) 
 
Equation (46*) is identical to (12*), therefore, the marginal utility gained from using the land 
either for housing or for the production of good C is equal for both the social planner and the 
private market.  
 
Substituting   C U from (40) into (44) 
0





 ,              ( 4 8 )  
Substituting the value of  w from (48) to (47) 
ec M EC M UE U C            (49*) 
 
Equation (49**) is identical to (13*). Therefore, for both the social planner and the private 
market, the marginal utility gained from using labor (time) for recreation equals the marginal 
utility gained from using labor for the production of good C. 
   15
Though the wage tax whas a negative sign the value is positive
5 since 0
e NM E  . In effect  w is a 
subsidy that increases the wage. The subsidy is necessary to achieve a first best solution since the 
household ignores the decrease in the value of the environment when making the household’s 
consumption decision with regard to the environment. The subsidy internalizes this externality. 
The numerator of the subsidy, () 
ee M Ee E M NU M NU E , is equal to the social marginal disutility 
due to the decrease in E from the household spending an additional unit of time on recreation. 
The denominator, the marginal utility of income, converts the utility to dollars.  
 
Finally, the last FOC of the social planner, (14*), can be obtained from the private market by 
substituting the value of   from (40) into (45) to get, 
 
ce E E C L M E NL e E NL UC U E M UE          (50*) 
 
The private market’s FOCs represented by equation (46*) (49*) and (50*) are identical to the 
social planners optimal FOCs (12*), (13*) and (14*). Therefore the wage subsidy,  w achieves 
the first best allocation. Though a wage subsidy might sound attractive to consumers it places a 
burden on the government budget. Therefore next, we consider an alternative recreation tax, i.e. 
a tax paid on the amount of time spent consuming the environmental good E.  
 
 
4.2.3. Government Provides E and Maximizes Net Utility with a Tax on Recreation  
 
The government still provides E by purchasing Le and equations (36) and (37) remain 
unchanged.  
 
The representative household sells the endowment of land, L, and part of the labor endowment, 
c M  in the market, and uses the remaining labor endowment for recreation,  e M . The time spent 
on recreation is taxed with a tax, e. This tax can be equally viewed as an entrance fee charged 
                                                 
5 As presented here a positive wage tax increases the wage, moving the household to allocate more time for work 
and less time for recreation.   16
per unit time spent in the environment. The individual purchases the consumption good, C, and 






Max U C H M E E   
s.t.  
(1 ) le x h e e p Lw M p Cp H M              ( 5 1 )    
 
The corresponding Lagrangian is,  
 
,,
(, , ;) [ ( 1 ) ]
e
el e x h e e CHM
Max U C H M E E p L w M p C p H M           (52)   
 
The household’s FOCs for C and H, (40) and (41) remain unchanged. The FOC for  e M takes the 
form,   
0
e eM E e MU E w               ( 5 3 )    
 
Equation (53) is identical to (42), therefore following the derivation in the previous section, an 
environmental tax or an entrance fee  e 


   will internalize the externality due to the 
congestion caused by using the environment and achieve the first best outcome.  
 
As presented, the environmental good E is provided by a public entity. Given this setup, to 
achieve the first best in the private markets require either a government or the conservation 
agency to maximize the total utility as in (36) or for a tax on the environmental good E as in 
(26). An alternative method would be to allow private provision of the public good. The last 
section looks at the private provision of the public environmental good.  
 
5. Private Provision of the Environmental Good 
We extend the utility function to include a term that represents the private provision of the land 
for the environment. The households get utility from providing land for the environment. The 
household’s utility function now takes the form   17
 
,, ,
(, , , ;)
ee
ee CHM L
Max U C H L M E E          ( 5 4 )  
 
5.1 Social Planners’ Problem 
The social planner maximizes the aggregate utility given the resource constraints,  
,, , ,
( , , ,; ) ( ( , ) , , ,( ,) ; ( ,) )  
ce h c e
ee cc h ee e e e e MMLLL
Max U C H L M E E U C L M L L M E NL NM E NL NM  
such that,  
(i)  che LLLL   
(ii)  ce M MM   
The resource constraints can be substituted into the objective function to get,  
 
,, (( , ) , , , ( , ) ;( , ) )   
ehe
h e eh e e ee ee MLL
Max U C L L L M M L NL M E NL NM E NL NM  (55) 
 
The first order necessary conditions necessary for a maximum,  
 
c hC L H L UC U           (56*) 
() ce eC M M E MU CUE             (57*) 
ce eC L L LU CU             (58*) 
 
Interpretation of the FOCs is similar to that in section 4.1.  
 
5.2 Private Markets 
Next we consider a general equilibrium set up with a representative household, producers and a 
government/environmental sector and analyze the tax instruments to achieve a first best 
outcome. The producers’ behavior remains unchanged from section 4 and the respective prices 
equal the marginal productivity. In this case, we substitute directly all the production functions in 
the household’s problem, so that the choice variables are directly the input variables, i.e. land 
and time. 
 
The representative household sells part of the endowment of land, Lc, for production of C, part of 
the endowment of land, LH, for the production of housing H, and keeps the remainder of the land   18
as wilderness. The household sells part of the labor endowment,  c M  in the market, and uses the 
remaining labor endowment for recreation,  e M . Each unit of land Lc sold in the market is taxed 
with  l  , and wage earned is taxed with a tax
6,  w. The household purchases the consumption 
good, C, and housing, H and pays a per unit tax for each unit of C and H,  C   and  H  respectively, 
and pays a per unit tax, e  , on the land set aside for the environment, Le. Then the household’s 
maximization problem is given by,
7 
,, ,,
(( , ) , , , ;)
CC He e
CC H ee LMLML
Max U C L M L L M E E    
s.t.  
CHe L LLL    
Ce M MM   
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ee C C H H l l e w e Lp C p Hp L L w M M               
 
Substituting the resource constraints and substituting prices by marginal production gives, 
 
,,
(( , ) , , , ;)
He e
He e H e e LML
Max U C L L L M M L L M E E   
 
.. ( ) ( , ) ( )




ee C C H e e H H
Ll e Mw e
C
st L p C L L L M M L




    
      
(59)
 
The household’s FOC are: 




HC L L C L H
C
LU C U C     


    

     ( 6 0 )  
(1 ) ( ) 0
Ce C C eC M M E C M M w MU C U E CC                 ( 6 1 )  
(1 ) ( ) 0
Ce C C eC L L C L e L l LU C U C C                   ( 6 2 )  
                                                 
6 This will again be a subsidy 
7 Alternatively since the households choice variables are C, H, Me and Le the households problem can also be 
formulated as, 
 
,, , (, , , ;)
ee
ee CHM L Max U C H L M E E
  
 s.t.   
 




me C C C C H H L l e M w e
C
Lp C L M L C L LC M    

        
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5.2.1  
First we show that two taxes can internalize the two externalities present.  




 , recall  () ee e M EN L e E N L NU E M NU E   , will internalize the 
externality caused by inadequate land being devoted to the environment and replicate the Social 




 , this is tax the 
input land for the composite good. 
 
Setting 0 HC     will result in replicating the social planners FOC in (56*). 
 




recall  () ee e M EN M e E N M NU E M NU E   which will replicate the social planners FOC in (57*). 
Therefore directly taxing environmental land (or land for C and H production) and wage can 
achieve a first best outcome. 
 
5.2.2 
On the other hand, it is possible to achieve the first best outcome without directly taxing wage, 
based on the marginal rates of substitution between land and time in the production functions. 
 




















 to get the social planners 
FOCs in (57*) and (56*). The first tax (on the composite commodity) is equal to the total 
marginal externality of a unit of time being used for recreation divided by the marginal product 
of a unit of time being used for the consumption good. The tax is effectively internalizing the 
externality of excess recreation. The tax on the composite commodity is a subsidy since the value 
of  C  is negative given that. 0
e NM E  . The subsidy increases the production of C and leads to an 
increase in the amount of time being used for the production of good C and therefore reduces the   20
amount of recreation. At the same time, the increase in the production of good C increases the 
amount of land devoted to producing C and therefore distorts the land market. To fix this 
distortion in the housing sector the price of housing needs to be subsidized by  H  . Since more 
land is being used for the production of good C, less land is devoted to the environment and this 











 . This tax does not address the externality of 
insufficient land being devoted to the environment given that households do not consider the 





will replicate the Social 
Planners FOC for the land sector (58*) and will optimally provide land for the environment 




Finally, we can correct the externality of insufficient land being provided for the environment by 
taxing the composite commodity and housing. This would then require the tax on wage to 
account for the externality of recreation but this tax would also need to fix the distortion in the 
labor market caused by the tax on the composite commodity. We let  0 el     and  0 C   , then 







  ,  H 













   achieve the first best outcome. 
The tax on the composite commodity and on housing internalizes the externality of not enough 
land being provided for the environment. The tax on wage addresses the distortion in the labor 








, and simultaneously internalizes the 




The tax placed on the composite commodity above consists of the externalities created by the 
total marginal use value and the total marginal non-use value. These two components of the 
                                                 








































   to 
get the same result.
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externality of insufficient land being provided for conservation can be fixed separately as below 





















 ,  () /
ee HM E L e TU E N M    , and
() //
ee C C wM E L e M L TU E N M C C       
 
Here the tax on the composite commodity, C  , accounts for the loss of recreation from not 
enough land being devoted to the environment, or the use value of the public good (or the sum of 
all the private marginal recreation benefits of the environmental land or public good). The tax on 
land sold for production, l  , accounts for the non-use value from not enough land being devoted 
to the environment, or the non-use value of the public good. The tax on the housing sector and 
wage can be interpreted as before. 
 
6. Conclusion.  
 
We analyze the tax instruments that can achieve a first best outcome in a world where 
households obtain utility from direct use of the environment and also from the existence and 
option value of the environment. First we analyze the case where the public good, the 
environment, is provided by a government or conservation agency. We show that a tax on 
recreation or a tax on wages can internalize the externality caused by congestion. Combining the 
wage or recreation tax with either a utility maximizing conservation agency or a profit 
maximizing conservation agency with a per unit lump sum tax on the environment achieves the 
first best outcome. Next we analyze the private provision of the environment good and show that 
a subsidy on the private land set aside for the environment combined with a recreation or wage 
tax can achieve the first best outcome. We then extend the scenario for the private provision of 
the environment good to analyze the use of alternate tax instruments to achieve the first best 
outcome. First, we show that a tax on the private land or a subsidy on the environmental land set 
aside for the environment combined with wage tax can achieve the first best outcome.  Second, 
without directly taxing wage, we show that a subsidy on the composite commodity can be used 
to internalize the externality of excess recreation and the first best outcome can be achieved with   22
a subsidy on the private and environmental land.  Third, the tax on the composite commodity can 
be used to internalize the externality of insufficient provision of land for the environment. 
Combining this tax with a tax on wage and distortion correcting taxes on the housing sector will 
achieve a first best allocation. In this case the tax on wage is larger as it also needs to address the 
distortions in the labor market caused by the tax on the composite commodity. We finally show 
that separate taxes aimed at the use value and the non-use value along with a housing and wage 
tax can achieve the first best allocation. 
 
The results from this paper illustrate that environmental externalities can be addressed with 
carefully designed tax instruments placed on non-environmental sectors in the economy, which 
are easier for the regulator to measure the use of resources and to ensure compliance rate. 
 
As next steps it would be worthwhile to expand the model to have two types of agents, one that 
engages in recreation and one that does not engage in recreation or one that values the 
environment and one that doesn’t value the environment and study the tax burdens. Further, it is 
often difficult to measure the use of resources and to ensure compliance rates that cause a market 
failure, thus implementing first best measures cannot be assumed. Therefore it would be useful to 
analyze optimal environmental taxes in the presence of other existing distortionary taxes. The 
general equilibrium framework presents here can also be used to study the optimal provision of 
ecosystem services and payment vehicles to sustain the services. Finally, the general equilibrium 
analysis presented here can be extended to see if the public provision of land for conservation 
decreases the private provision of land for conservation. 
 
The importance of protecting the biodiversity in our ecosystems is crucial, at the same time many 
conservation agencies struggle to fund their conservation activities. The General Equilibrium 
analysis in this paper shows that it is possible to obtain the first best outcome in a world where 
households value the environment by using tax instruments to collect funds for conservation 
activities.  The model as originally presented by Anas (1988) requires the measuring of the total 
environmental benefits to achieve an optimal allocation. The extensions that we present allow the 
optimal allocation to be achieved with a two part tax that avoids the need to directly tax the 
environmental sector.    23
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